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To achieve project objectives, construction project managers have to manoeuvre 
through complex coordination structures. They have to simultaneously deal with 
limited budgets, tight schedules, demanding stakeholders and a fragmented supply-
chain. Despite their extensive coordination efforts, project managers are frequently 
confronted with unexpected delays that force them to improvise and re-plan. As a 
consequence, budgets and schedules tend to overrun and project organisations appear 
out-of-control rather than stable and reliable. To enrich our understanding of these 
phenomena, we propose using the theoretical lens of High Reliability Organising 
(HRO). HRO stems from research into high hazard industries, and is relatively new to 
construction management. It provides five generic guiding principles that help 
practitioners anticipate and contain unwanted events. Given that the use of HRO 
beyond high hazard contexts is not universally accepted within the scientific 
community, we ask whether it is justified to apply the HRO lens to the organisation 
and coordination of 'mainstream' construction projects. We elaborate on this issue by 
addressing its main theoretical concepts, its origin and its application beyond the 
fields of risk and safety. We further explain why reductionist interpretations of HRO 
concepts unnecessarily limit HRO's research domain. We propose a pragmatic 
reinterpretation of HRO that provides access to the field of construction management. 
Finally, we present preliminary results of our study into delays and overruns in inner-
city subsurface utility reconstruction projects. Our theoretical and empirical 
arguments provide a stepping-stone for future HRO research projects in the 
construction management field.  
Keywords: organisation, productivity, project management, reliability, mindfulness. 
INTRODUCTION 
Scoping and delivering projects is the core business of the construction industry. 
Reliably achieving agreed project targets is crucial for the success of clients, 
construction firms and other stakeholders in the industry. Among these projects, 
subsurface utility construction projects are very much in the minds and view of the 
community: they are both exposed and notorious for overrunning schedules and 
budgets. These projects amount to complicated coordination puzzles that are often 
constrained by tight budgets and deadlines. Numerous public and private clients, 
contractors and authorities are involved and have to plan, monitor and align their 
interrelated activities. However, despite good intentions and a significant time spent 
on early stage coordination, it seems in practice that project plans are often 
overloaded. Especially in inner-city areas, subsurface utility reconstruction projects 
generate noise and dust and impede traffic flows, access to locations and the 
                                                 
1
 l.l.oldescholtenhuis@utwente.nl 
functionality of spaces. Pressures to reduce the burden and hindrance to businesses 
and people living and working close to such projects are high, limiting the opportunity 
to include slack in the scheduling. As a result, any unwanted events derail 
construction schemes and force project managers to re-plan and improvise in an 
already tightly coupled schedule of activities. Consequentially, budgets and schedules 
have to be extended, stakeholders become frustrated and the public perceive the 
industry and its project predictions as unreliable. In studying the phenomena of 
coordination in these utility projects, we have spent a significant amount of time in the 
field. We explored how practitioners try to achieve project goals while coping with 
unwanted events and tight project plans. We also explored whether new ICT 
instruments contribute to improved alignment and inter-organisational coordination of 
interrelated construction activities. To structure and analyse our empirical data, we 
look through the lens of High Reliability Organising (HRO). Pragmatically, this lens 
seems to be of value as its concepts and principles focus on increasing performance 
reliability through anticipation and containment of unwanted events.  
Unfortunately, when we present our research findings to scientific peers, the 
discussion often stagnates as we are confronted with debates about the legitimacy of 
applying the HRO lens. Rather than focusing on the projects and their issues, debates 
drift into disputes about whether applying the HRO lens is justifiable in the 
construction management domain. As these debates frequently distract from the 
presentation of our work, we have decided to challenge this critique and respond to 
the debate in this paper.  
In this positioning paper, we aim to move on from this debate about the legitimacy of 
using the HRO lens and refocus on the coordination of utility projects. This paper is 
structured as follows: the first section describes the origin and concepts of HRO. Next, 
we explain how a reductionist interpretation of the HRO terms and contexts hampers 
the acknowledgment of the HRO lens's pragmatic value. We then illustrate how HRO 
principles apply to mainstream organisations. Further, we use the HRO lens to explore 
coordination of utility projects. The paper concludes by restating our view that a 
pragmatic reinterpretation of HRO provides a lens through which one can study 
reliability issues associated with construction projects.  
 
HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANISING: ORIGIN AND CONCEPTS 
High Reliability Organising research focuses on how the presence, or lack, of 
structures, mechanisms and routines within high hazard organisations leads to failures 
and catastrophes. HRO scholars have developed insights into how practitioners seek to 
enhance reliable performance, and avoid non-goal actions and non-goal results, by 
looking at how practitioners cope with potential errors and undesirable events. We 
first address the theoretical fields upon which HRO builds, and we then define two 
important HRO concepts: mindfulness and heedful interrelated action. This set of 
concepts and principles is referred to in this paper as the 'HRO lens'.  
The foundations for the development of HRO is Perrow’s (1984) Normal Accidents 
Theory (NAT). NAT was derived through a retrospective analysis of the meltdown 
disaster at the US Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. Perrow's concept was that 
organisations could be categorised along two attribute axes: complexities and 
couplings. He concluded that organisations that have tight couplings and interactive 
complexities are vulnerable to accidents. Inspired by Perrow’s findings, a Berkeley-
based research group (including LaPorte, Rochlin, Schulman and Roberts) became 
interested in how organisations in high hazard environments perform so exceptionally 
well – that is virtually error-free. By observing how organisations cope with failures, 
Roberts (1990) was one of the first scholars to define the characteristics of a Highly 
Reliable Organisation. Successive studies on, for example, the Challenger Explosion 
(Roberts and Rousseau 1989), the Mann Gulch forest fire (Weick 1993) and naval 
aircraft carriers (Weick and Roberts 1993) advanced insights into the reliable 
performance of similar high hazard organisations and further developed the High 
Reliability Organising theory.  
One commonly used concept drawn from High Reliability Organising is 'mindfulness' 
(Weick, Sutcliffe et al. 1999; Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). In essence, mindfulness 
comprises a set of principles that describe how organisations can enhance reliability of 
their performance. The five principles are divided into two categories: anticipation and 
containment (see Figure 1). Anticipation focuses on identifying and preventing 
potential unwanted situations, while containment is about reacting to, and recovering 
from such situations. Both categories will be further elaborated below. 
Sensitivity to operations
Preoccupation with failures
Reluctance to simplify
Commitment to resilience
Deference to expertise
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Figure 1 - concepts of mindfulness and heedfully interrelated action that lead to 
enhanced reliable performance (adapted from Weick et al. 1999) 
The first anticipatory principle is 'sensitivity to operations'. Practitioners that follow 
this principle continually try to make sense of interrelated operational tasks and know 
how these tasks might be influenced and change over time. The second anticipatory 
principle is 'preoccupation with failures'. Through this, organisations continuously try 
to identify potential causes of failures and delays. They try to record and learn from 
previous faults to better cope should similar events occur in the future. The third 
aspect is that organisations that anticipate unwanted events have a 'reluctance to 
simplify' interpretations: they challenge standard assumptions and deliberately try to 
interpret observations in as much detail as possible. These three anticipatory principles 
help organisations identify potential failures and create strategies for dealing with 
them. 
Principles related to mindfulness further focus on containing unexpected and 
unwanted situations. Such events can derail operations, and containment aims to 
reduce their negative impact. The fourth mindfulness principle, 'commitment to 
resilience', allows organisations to recover from unexpected situations. Organisations 
following this principle buffer resources, and create and update failure-recovery plans. 
In case of an unwanted event, they further change decision-making structures from 
hierarchical and formal into more flexible informal horizontal structures. The fifth 
mindfulness principle refers to a 'reliance on expertise' for solving problems. 
Organisations that follow this principle favour expert opinions over, for example, 
commercial pressures.  
Another concept central to High Reliability Organisation theory is heedful interrelated 
action. When interacting in a heedful way, practitioners execute their own tasks but 
understand how this individual task is influenced by, and contributes to, related 
actions by others within a system (Weick and Roberts 1993). This increased attention 
to interdependencies contributes to a more reliable performance.  
Although HRO ideas stem from research in high hazard industries, we argue that its 
concepts can help in understanding reliability in mainstream organisations. As this 
line is far from universally accepted, the next section describes how the classical HRO 
research setting complicates the use of the HRO lens other industries. 
 
THE HRO LABEL CONFUSES  
This section explains how reductionist interpretations of the terms High Reliability 
and Organising are obstructive when presenting findings on reliable coordination of 
subsurface utility reconstruction projects. We offer a critique of the reductionist 
perspective on HRO, and propose looking through the HRO lens from a pragmatic 
viewpoint. 
People introduced to the principles of HRO often assert that only organisations that 
can be characterised as 'highly reliable' can use the HRO lens to boost performance
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This stance frequently turns our research presentations into a reductionist debate on 
whether a construction project can be a ‘High Reliability Organisation’ or not. 
Bourrier (2011) described classical High Reliability Organisations as performing well 
while being bounded by a strict no-failure requirement. Reductionists would therefore 
argue that only error-free organisations can be 'highly reliable'; and the HRO label is 
strictly reserved for error-free organisations. If this is the case, should an 'HRO' 
organisation lose its HRO label when an error occurs? Authors with a less rigid view 
accept that highly reliable organisations can make mistakes and operate in a “nearly 
error-free fashion” (LaPorte and Consolini 1991). This nuanced interpretation blurs 
the distinction between highly reliable and not so highly reliable organisations, and 
enlarges the population of 'HROs'. This then allows a broader range of organisations 
to adopt the HRO lens.  
The term 'organisation' also confuses. Often, the initial interpretation of 'organisation' 
reflects Morgan’s machine metaphor (Morgan 1997 pp.11-31). This then directs the 
focus towards studying structural and procedural aspects, whereas the HRO lens 
seems to be more about behaviour and processes than structure. Although HRO 
scholars have tried to avoid this misunderstanding by using 'organising' rather than 
'organisation', this has not ended the debate surrounding the structural characteristics 
of an HRO.  
Finally, does the shifting boundary between HROs and non-HROs diffuse the debate? 
We think only slightly, and that it makes little practical sense to determine whether 
organisations are 'real HROs'. The categorisation and classification debate generates 
only limited insight into the way the concepts that constitute the HRO lens can be 
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 This is analogous to the idea that the perspectives and concepts of quality control can only be applied 
to organisations that are already acknowledged for their high quality products.  
used. It would seem more productive to abandon the reductionist perspective and 
concentrate on how the HRO lens can help any organisation enhance its performance. 
 
HRO RESEARCH IS UNNESSESARILY CONFINED TO HIGH 
HAZARD INDUSTRIES AND SAFETY ISSUES  
It is often argued that HRO labels and concepts should be confined to high hazard 
industries. High hazard industries are strongly linked to safety, and accept high 
societal and organisational costs, deal with extensive regulation and procedural 
requirements and are often protected from market forces (Schulman 2011). This 
situation suggests that having unsafe and risky environments force organisations to 
follow HRO concepts, which subsequently lead to reliable performance. HRO is thus 
presumed to be a natural contingent response to a high hazard environment. In less 
hazardous environments, organisations should not need to afford the investments 
required to make them reliable. In this line of reasoning, the terms reliable and safe 
are lumped together and substitute for one another without explanation. This seems to 
be due to the 'fact' that HROs in high hazard environments are 'reliably safe'. This 
linguistic contamination of terms obscures the reasoning and the debate. The fact that 
classical HROs have such a strong focus on safety neither logically implies that 
reliability should be confined to safety, nor that HROs should be confined to the high 
hazard domain. The simple fact that hazardous environments encourage certain 
organisations to use HRO principles does not prohibit organisations in less hazardous 
environments utilising the HRO lens, maybe to some lesser extent, to become more 
reliable. We therefore take a pragmatic stance and argue that the term reliability is not 
confined to safety, and may also refer to other goals set by an organisation.  
By replacing the reductionist view with a pragmatic perspective on HRO, research can 
benefit from productive discussions about processes and principles that enhance the 
reliability of organisations (see Table 1 for a comparison of the perspectives). Next 
section provides examples of how other scientific fields borrowed the HRO lens. 
Table 1: comparing the reductionist and pragmatic perspective on HRO  
 Reductionist view Pragmatic view 
Unit of analysis Structure and context of typical HROs  Processes and principles that 
enhance reliable performance 
Meaning of reliability Reliability as an absolute goal Reliability as a process 
Function of HRO lens Distinguishing HROs from non-HROs Understanding reliability issues and 
processes that enhance reliably  
Main assumptions Org's are either highly reliable or not 
HRO concepts do not apply to non-
classical HROs 
Org's can seek to enhance reliability  
HRO lens applies to common 
organisational goals 
 
HRO CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES OBSERVED IN 
MAINSTREAM ORGANISATIONS  
Insights from High Reliability Organising are relevant for mainstream organisations 
because they "provide a window on a distinctive set of processes that foster 
effectiveness under trying conditions" (Weick, Sutcliffe et al. 1999). Roberts and Bea 
(2001) suggest the same by stating that “neither the sausage maker, nor the chemical-
plant manager is immune from errors that can have far-reaching consequences.” These 
perspectives do not bother defining and identifying HROs, instead they focus on the 
underlying reliability-enhancing processes and characteristics (Lekka 2011). This 
alternative approach to HRO becomes more visible as we see its concepts cross their 
original boundaries and slowly find their application in mainstream businesses. This 
section provides several examples of studies that have observed mindfulness and 
heedful interrelationships taking place outside the domain of high hazard industries.  
At the first European ProHRO conference in The Hague (2011), various scholars 
presented research on reliable processes within regular organisations such as 
educational institutes, the police, detention centres, theatre and manufacturing. 
Further, the literature reports on the application of the HRO lens in aviation, oil 
production and the railway sector (Roberts 2009) and in hospitals (Vogus and 
Sutcliffe 2007). Closer to construction, one also sees scholars exploring how 
practitioners can apply principles of mindfulness to support the effective adoption of 
information technology (Swanson and Ramiller 2004). Further, De Bruijne and Van 
Eeten (2007) analysed how restructuring the utility sector impacted on the 
performance reliability of large technical infrastructure. Finally, Mitropoulos and 
Cupido (2009) looked into the work practices of high and low performing residential 
framing crews. They found that a guiding principle of ‘going a little slower to avoid 
mistakes’ helped crews to finish their work quicker, while also resulting in fewer 
errors and accidents. All these studies present elements that resemble behaviour that 
is, explicitly or implicitly, related to the HRO concepts. The next section brings the 
discussion closer to the construction industry.  
 
MINDFUL PRACTICES IN UTILITY CONSTRUCTION 
PROJECTS 
Here we return to the context outlined in the introduction, our domain of research: the 
coordination of inner-city subsurface utility reconstruction projects. Our aim is to 
provide an example of how researchers could use concepts from the HRO lens. We 
discuss our research efforts and address the typical coordination in utility projects. 
Finally, some observations made during the study are described and related to the 
HRO lens, in particular to the concept of mindfulness. 
During our study of reliability issues in utility projects, we studied three such 
reconstruction projects taking place in a mid-sized Dutch city (150,000 inhabitants). 
In these projects, the municipality, several service providers and (sub)contractors 
planned and executed a number of tasks related to the reconstruction of cables, pipes, 
sewers, intersections, squares and road sections in both residential and commercial 
areas. The overall duration of the projects varied between six and twelve months. In 
this period, we spent a significant amount of time with practitioners observing 
planning and execution activities. We attended over thirty multi-stakeholder meetings, 
joined construction site visits, and had informal dialogues with experienced 
practitioners. We also interviewed nearly ten practitioners to retrospectively analyse a 
project that overran its schedule by more than fifty per cent.  
Inner-city utility projects are known for their unreliable performance. During these 
projects, both municipalities and private utility companies, who both own distinct 
parts of the overall subsurface infrastructure, plan and execute construction work in a 
shared public space. While the municipality will procure work according to EU 
regulations, other utility owners commonly each employ their preferred contractors in 
framework agreements. This diffused ownership and contractor mobilisation, coupled 
with a limited and shared physical space, complicates the coordination of construction 
work. We estimate that, as a consequence of this complexity, delays force the 
managers of the majority of such projects to abandon initial plans, improvise and re-
plan, resulting in projects overshooting both budgets and deadlines. Perhaps 
surprisingly, most clients and contractors seem able to enumerate the main causes of 
these delays and overruns. Although this knowledge should help them in anticipating 
future delays, it seems that practitioners repeatedly overlook or neglect many potential 
issues. If this is the current situation, how could the HRO lens add to the 
understanding and managing of this coordination practice? Below, the principles of 
mindfulness are placed in the context of the just described project practices.    
We observed limited 'sensitivity to operational issues' in several construction 
meetings. During these meetings, many discussions were blocked because of a client’s 
limited knowledge of interrelated operational activities. One reason for this is that 
subcontracting policies distanced clients from actual construction processes. Further, 
fragmented ownership of the utility network and ambiguous lines of command 
impeded clients’ awareness of interrelated operational processes. Since no client was 
formally in command of overall project coordination, they all approached their 
projects as isolated processes, neglecting the management of interfaces with related 
construction activities.  
With regard to the 'preoccupation with failure' principle, we found that most site 
supervisors and contractors had a fairly comprehensive view of which unwanted 
onsite events could occur. Our dialogues with practitioners, for example, showed that 
they were able to provide detailed examples of events that had held up construction. 
These were, for example, blind-cutting, detecting potentially hazardous objects and 
poor weather conditions. Despite their knowledge of such failures, we did not observe 
work planners taking this into account when developing construction plans.  
Further, municipal utility renewal programmes set strict deadlines for the execution of 
projects, putting pressure on planning and scheduling activities. As a consequence, a 
lack of time prevented work planners in one of our cases from thoroughly studying 
existing site conditions. As existing site maps were already of poor quality, the work 
planners greatly oversimplified conditions and project plans. Additionally, we were 
told by experienced project managers that they assume ideal and unhampered 
construction progress almost every time when they make project schedules. Their 
logic seems to be that: “you never know when hold ups will actually occur”. In the 
end, such simplified plans and schedules do not contain contingencies and are, not 
surprisingly, waylaid by unexpected problems during the project’s execution.  
We expected practitioners to follow the 'commitment to resilience' principle when 
they had structures in place that enabled them to quickly react to unwanted delays in 
the construction work. This was limitedly possible in practice. For one, we found that 
project managers hardly had back-up strategies in place. Besides, re-planning and 
improvisation was inefficient as many work changes needed to be formally approved 
through time-consuming procurement procedures. 
Clients and contractors seem to strongly follow the principle of 'deference to 
expertise'. The site managers were often unable to explain the formal organisation 
structure and the positions of the 'partners' on site. They knew, however, who to 
contact in the event of an issue arising. During unplanned, unexpected situations, 
contractors therefore try to circumvent formal procedures and directly contact the 
appropriate manager or supervisor. As an outcome, practitioners informally agree to 
quickly reschedule small project components or temporarily suspend construction. 
Beyond describing the reliability complexities and issues that need to be addressed in 
utility project coordination practice, our aim is also to better understand how new 
technologies can enhance reliability in utility project coordination. We elaborate on 
this idea briefly by hypothesising about how a 4D-CAD scheduling tool could 
enhance reliability of practice. 
Our research shows that 3D- and 4D- CAD construction process visualisations help in 
confronting the lack of information, avoiding the urge to oversimplify and to ignore 
potential delays. Practitioners become particularly sensitised to operational 
interdependencies when designs are integrated on the 3D level, and are pushed 
towards schedule integration when 4D-CAD approaches are used. 3D design and 4D-
clash-detection help practitioners to enhance their awareness of potential errors and 
failures. Through scenario-based scheduling, the tool also allows practitioners to 
acquire in-depth knowledge of alternative project schemes, making projects more 
resilient to unwanted situations.  
Pragmatically, the HRO lens provides a valuable structure for making sense of the 
coordination challenge and the behaviour of the practitioners involved. The lens 
further supports future policymakers in their efforts to make plans that enhance the 
reliability of utility projects, and allows researchers to study causalities between new 
technologies and reliability on these projects. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
Debates about the legitimacy of applying the HRO lens frequently distract from the 
diffusion of insights into the complicated dynamics of coordinating subsurface utility 
construction projects. Rather than discussing the projects and their issues, our 
presentations turn into reductionist 'either-or' discussions as to whether construction 
projects are High Reliability Organisations. We argue that this categorical way of 
defining HROs is irrelevant as it prevents researchers reaching a deeper understanding 
of utility project coordination. This paper aims to move on from the recurring dispute 
over the application of HRO theory and concepts in the construction domain. The 
debate as to whether the utilisation of the HRO perspective is permissible and justified 
as a lens in Construction Management (CM) research obstructs the wider application 
of the HRO perspective in the construction domain and in the CM field. Based on our 
research into the coordination in subsurface utility reconstruction works, and the value 
we experience in this HRO perspective, we have argued that the CM-application of 
HRO is permissible. Although some argue that the HRO lens is not applicable to the 
construction industry, we would point out that this study is not the first to adopt a 
theoretical lens from another field. Researchers frequently exchange theoretical lenses 
to understand phenomena in novel ways. For example, other cross-fertilisation has 
occurred through the adoption of theories from economics, supply-chain management 
and computer engineering. Despite the fact that these fields were very different to 
construction, CM researchers successfully adopted theories such as Transaction Costs, 
LEAN and Systems Engineering. This argument supports the exploration of how the 
HRO lens can be applied to construction management research.  
To try and understand the position taken by those scholars who feel that the HRO 
perspective cannot be applied in the construction domain, and is therefore irrelevant, 
we tested the arguments that deem HRO to be impermissible in a construction context. 
Firstly, we found that the terms High Reliability and Organising seem to confuse the 
debate. These terms steer the debate towards a reductionist classification issue. 
Secondly, restricting the HRO ideas to the high hazard environment where it was first 
applied is difficult to defend. Many of the key HRO scholars have themselves rejected 
that stance, and researched HRO in other industries and domains. Further, some 
valuable research has already been published on HRO in the construction domain. The 
connection often made between the HRO perspective and safety also seems to be 
related to linguistic blurring of the terms reliable and safe. HRO is primarily focussed 
on reducing errors. Since the classical HROs needed to be “reliably safe”, the terms 
'reliable' and 'safe' became virtually synonymous. The initially selected domain had 
safety as its main performance parameter. We argue that organisations in other 
domains can still opt for error-free performance and reliability in terms of other 
parameters without compromising HRO principles.  
To illustrate the descriptive power of the HRO lens, this paper has also described how 
its principles apply to mainstream organisations such as hospitals, service providers 
and framing crews. Additionally, the study shows how the HRO lens can be used to 
describe the intricacies of coordinating a utility construction project.  
In moving the scientific debate in the direction of the HRO lens (involving 
mindfulness and heedful interrelated actions), we create a breeding ground for the 
more widespread use of the HRO lens in construction management research. We seek 
to advance HRO developments by arguing for a more pragmatic interpretation of the 
HRO lens. The HRO lens has merits for scholars as well as practitioners in 
construction management.  
To move ahead, we urge CM scholars to suppress any reductionist classification 
impulses, to free the HRO lens from its restriction to a classical (high hazard) HRO 
environment, to focus on reliability rather than safety and to experiment with the 
principles of mindful organising and heedful interrelationships to study reliable 
processes in construction projects.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH EFFORTS  
This study's empirical findings are of a preliminary character. We have not attempted 
to draw definitive conclusions in presenting the HRO principles, and future research 
needs to examine construction’s HRO lens in more detail. More specifically, it might 
be that some concepts and principles better fit the construction industry context than 
others. Research should therefore put further effort into contextualising (i.e. refining, 
adapting or extending) the HRO lens for the construction domain. This requires 
researchers to learn more about both well and poorly performing construction projects. 
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